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Tipping the Balance in Favor of Justice: Due Process and 
the Thirteenth and Nineteenth Amendments in Child 
Removal from Battered Mothers 
I. INTRODUCTION 
After Sharwline Nicholson was assaulted by her boyfriend for the 
first time, the Administration for Child Services (“ACS”) of New York 
took her children without a court proceeding and temporarily placed 
them with foster parents. This action was particularly surprising because 
the children had not been abused by either their father or their mother.1 
Without determining who was at fault, ACS concluded that Nicholson 
was unfit to parent because she had “engage[d] in acts of domestic 
violence,” even though she had not assaulted her children or her 
boyfriend but was only assaulted herself.2 ACS took Nicholson’s 
children from her and charged her with neglect simply because her 
children witnessed abuse against her.3 
Nicholson’s experience was not unique, as she represented a class of 
mothers who had children removed under similar circumstances. In what 
has already been called a “landmark” ruling,4 Nicholson v. Williams held 
that the ACS policy violated abused mothers’ substantive due process 
rights by taking away their children “solely because the mother[s] [had] 
been abused.”5 Judge Weinstein held that the city violated substantive 
due process by infringing on the fundamental right to parent and be 
 
 1. Nicholson v. Williams, 203 F. Supp. 2d 153, 168–69 (E.D.N.Y. 2002). ACS reported that 
Nicholson’s son was hit one time by his father because of a bad report at school. Id. at 169. 
 2. Id. at 171. ACS also found that other mothers had “engage[d] in domestic violence” when 
they were beaten by their partners. See id. at 186. 
 3. Id. at 171. ACS did not even tell Nicholson where her children had been placed, and 
when she was finally allowed to visit them, she was able to “locate her daughter within the building 
by following the sounds of her crying.” Id. at 169, 172. When Nicholson found her daughter, she 
was “sitting on a chair by herself with tears running down [her face].” Id. at 172. She “had a rash on 
her face, yellow pus running from her nose, and she appeared to have scratched herself.” Id. Her son 
had a swollen eye and was later reported to have asked his next foster mother if she was going to hit 
him. Id. 
 4. Chris Lombardi, Justice for Battered Women, THE NATION, July 15, 2002, at 24. 
 5. Nicholson, 203 F. Supp. 2d at 250. The court also found that the mothers’ procedural due 
process rights were violated. Id. 
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raised by parents without a showing of a substantial state interest.6 In 
addition to finding a Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process 
violation against the city, the court suggested that the Thirteenth7 and 
Nineteenth8 Amendments should be “added” to this Fourteenth 
Amendment analysis.9 The court stated that “mothers are entitled to a 
particularly scrupulous protection of their rights to custody of their 
children in construing the Fourteenth Amendment in light of the . . . 
Thirteenth and Nineteenth [Amendments].”10 
The Nicholson court also observed that “[t]he law cannot ignore the 
profound sexual connotations of the Thirteenth Amendment” and that the 
“exact language of the Thirteenth Amendment could be construed to 
cover children forcibly and unnecessarily removed without due 
process . . . .”11 Additionally, the court found that the Nineteenth 
Amendment “bears on the [substantive due process] analysis . . . . 
particularly in the context of domestic abuse . . . . [since it] was designed 
to put females on the same legal constitutional plane as males.”12 While 
noting that the Thirteenth and Nineteenth Amendments could aid a 
Fourteenth Amendment analysis, the Nicholson court did not adequately 
articulate the precise impact either of the amendments could have on the 
substantive due process analysis or how this analysis would impact a 
future battered mother’s substantive due process claim. Although 
existing case law and commentary discuss substantive due process in the 
context of child custody,13 there have been no prior attempts in the 
 
 6. Id. at 251. 
 7. Section 1 of the Thirteenth Amendment provides that “[n]either slavery nor involuntary 
servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall 
exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 
1. Section 2 provides that “Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate 
legislation.” Id. § 2. 
 8. The Nineteenth Amendment provides in part that “[t]he right of citizens of the United 
States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of 
sex.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIX. 
 9. Nicholson, 203 F. Supp. 2d at 247–48. The Thirteenth and Nineteenth Amendments were 
not critical to the court’s finding of a due process violation in Nicholson, but as shown in infra Part 
V of this Comment, these amendments should shape courts’ substantive due process analyses in all 
similar cases. 
 10. Id. at 248. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Christopher L. Blakesley, Comparativist Ruminations from the Bayou on Child Custody 
Jurisdiction: The UCCJA, the PKPA, and the Hague Convention on Child Abduction, 58 LA. L. REV. 
449, 450 (1998) (arguing that in some situations the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act 
(UCCJA) violates substantive due process); Erwin Chemerinsky, Substantive Due Process, 15 
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literature to articulate the connection between the Thirteenth and 
Nineteenth Amendments and a Fourteenth Amendment substantive due 
process analysis.14 Furthermore, prior to Judge Weinstein in Nicholson, 
no commentator has argued that the Thirteenth and Nineteenth 
Amendments should be combined in the context of domestic violence.15 
This Comment builds on earlier writings by arguing that the Thirteenth 
Amendment’s prohibition of slavery-like treatment and the Nineteenth 
Amendment’s guarantee of autonomy bolster a battered mother’s 
Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process claim when her children 
have been taken from her solely because she was abused. The Thirteenth 
 
TOURO L. REV. 1501, 1501 (1999) (noting that the word “liberty” in the Due Process Clause 
indicates that “parents have a fundamental right to the custody of their children” (citation omitted)); 
Beth A. Diebel, Note, Mark G. v. Sabol: Substantive Due Process Rights, a Possibility for Foster 
Care Children in New York, 64 ALB. L. REV. 823, 850 (2000) (arguing that “[c]ustodial 
determination creates a special relationship with the state, obligating the state to protect the foster 
child’s substantive due process rights”). 
 14. This is perhaps because the Nineteenth Amendment was originally intended only to grant 
women the right to vote and not to grant women more independence in society. See infra note 71 and 
accompanying text. The Thirteenth Amendment was also intended to deal with African slavery 
rather than abuse. See infra notes 77–79, 108 and accompanying text. Legal scholars have argued 
that victims of abuse should be able to sustain a Thirteenth Amendment claim against their batterers 
for creating a slavery-like condition. See MICHAEL VORENBERG, FINAL FREEDOM: THE CIVIL WAR, 
THE ABOLITION OF SLAVERY, AND THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT 248 (2001) (Some scholars have 
argued that the Thirteenth Amendment “should protect . . . abused women . . . and all other victims 
of relationships reminiscent of slavery.”); Akhil Reed Amar, Remember the Thirteenth, 10 CONST. 
COMMENT. 403 (1993); Akhil Reed Amar & Daniel Widawsky, Child Abuse as Slavery: A 
Thirteenth Amendment Response to Deshaney, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1359, 1365–66 (1992). Scholars 
have also argued that the Nineteenth Amendment can strengthen the Fourteenth Amendment Equal 
Protection Clause in creating a more solid constitutional basis for claims of violence by women 
against their batterers. Reva B. Siegel, She the People: The Nineteenth Amendment, Sex Equality, 
Federalism, and the Family, 115 HARV. L. REV. 947, 947–52, 1024–30 (2002); Sarah B. Lawsky, 
Note, A Nineteenth Amendment Defense of the Violence Against Women Act, 109 YALE L.J. 783, 786 
(2000) (arguing that the Violence Against Women Act would be a valid constitutional exercise of 
power under the Nineteenth Amendment). 
 15. While courts often do not apply multiple constitutional amendments in a single analysis, 
the Supreme Court has relied on a penumbra theory of privacy rights that relies on multiple 
amendments. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965) (noting that a birth control law 
concerned “a relationship lying within the zone of privacy created by several fundamental 
constitutional guarantees”); see also Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. 323, 341 (1966) (“Specific 
guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that 
give them life and substance.”). The zone of privacy is created by the “right of association contained 
in the penumbra of the First Amendment,” the Third Amendment prohibition “against the quartering 
of soldiers ‘in any house’ in time of peace without the consent of the owner,” the Fourth Amendment 
affirmation of the “right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures” as well as the Fifth Amendment Self-Incrimination 
Clause that “enables the citizen to create a zone of privacy which government may not force him to 
surrender to his detriment.” Id. (citations omitted). 
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and Nineteenth Amendments bolster a battered mother’s claim by 
recognizing the additional guarantees of autonomy under the Nineteenth 
Amendment16 and freedom from slavery-like conditions under the 
Thirteenth Amendment within the scope of her substantive due process 
rights.17 
Part II of this Comment describes the complex nature of a battering 
relationship and illustrates how state reactions may wrongfully punish 
and blame a victim for an abuser’s actions. Part III sets forth the 
traditional substantive due process analysis and describes the challenges 
such an analysis presents for battered mothers who bring substantive due 
process claims against the state for removal of their children based solely 
on the fact that the mother was battered. Part IV explores the historical 
connection between the Thirteenth and Nineteenth Amendments. It first 
shows how the Nineteenth Amendment symbolized a movement to 
provide women with the opportunity to represent themselves legally and 
politically.18 It then explains how the Thirteenth Amendment may cover 
slavery-like conditions such as coercive battering.19 Part V incorporates 
the values derived from the discussion of the Thirteenth and Nineteenth 
Amendments into a substantive due process analysis that balances a 
state’s interest in protecting children against a mother’s parental right, 
right to autonomy, and right to freedom from slavery-like treatment in 
deciding whether removal of the children is proper. Part VI offers a brief 
conclusion. 
II. COMPLEX DYNAMICS OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND  
STATE ACTORS’ CONTRIBUTION TO  
ENTRAPMENT OF BATTERED MOTHERS 
In an attempt to guard the interests of children and families, courts 
and child protection agencies may unintentionally punish battered 
mothers for the abuse inflicted by their partners. As in Nicholson, where 
 
 16. See infra Part IV. 
 17. See infra Part V. 
 18. See Siegel, supra note 14, at 1007–19. 
 19. See Joyce E. McConnell, Beyond Metaphor: Battered Women, Involuntary Servitude and 
the Thirteenth Amendment, 4 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 207, 229 (1992). The term “coercive 
battering,” which is coined in this Comment, will be used throughout to describe relationships that 
do not involve a single incident of violence but those that involve physical, emotional, and often 
sexual violence that escalates over a period of time. Id. “Coercive battering” also involves isolation 
and threats of injury or death to a woman over a period of time, including “degradation and isolation 
of the woman being battered.” Id. 
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ACS removed the children after an incident of domestic abuse, state 
actors sometimes remove children from abused mothers or charge them 
with neglect or failure to protect their children simply because the 
mothers were unable to prevent their children from witnessing the 
abuse.20 It is of utmost importance for the state to protect children from 
abuse, and sometimes state bodies must remove children from abusive 
homes in order to protect them from future harm.21 In many states, 
statutes or common law require mothers and fathers to take reasonable 
steps to protect their children from abuse.22 This Comment does not 
intend to undermine such laws that protect children from abuse. Instead, 
it suggests that when the children are not abused themselves, but only 
witness domestic abuse,23 courts should consider what is reasonable for 
 
 20. Nicholson v. Williams, 203 F. Supp. 2d 153, 169–71 (2002) (holding that removal of 
children from battered mothers was improper when the children were not abused by the batterer and 
the mother did not participate in any violence). Other courts have blamed mothers for their partners’ 
abuse when the children have not been abused. See State v. J.R.C. (In re C.D.C.), 455 N.W.2d 801, 
807 (Neb. 1990) (terminating battered mother’s parental right because mother did not separate from 
the batterer—despite the fact that the mother did nothing to harm her child and despite reports of the 
batterer kicking, punching, burning, and dragging the mother across a parking lot by her hair—and 
blaming the mother for failing in her parental responsibility to provide her child with a violence-free 
environment). After reporting abuse, some battered mothers are often treated as the cause of the 
abuse by being referred to domestic violence education and parenting classes. See Laura M. 
Fernandez, Domestic Violence and the Child Welfare System 2 (2002) (unpublished manuscript, on 
file with author). However, her abusive partner often gets a slap on the hand with either an anger 
management class or a parenting class and nothing further. G. Kristian Miccio, A Reasonable 
Battered Mother? Redefining, Reconstructing, and Recreating the Battered Mother in Child 
Protective Proceedings, 22 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 89, 101 (1999). 
 21. Cornhusker Christian Children’s Home, Inc. v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of Neb., 416 N.W.2d 
551, 561–62 (Neb. 1987) (holding that while parents’ natural rights to their children have been 
protected by the courts, “society also has a paramount interest in the protection of . . . children” 
when parents’ discipline cause the child “emotional or physical harm”). 
 22. See 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 50/1 (2002); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 7001-1.3 (West 
2002); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-736 (Law Co-op. 2002); Palmer v. State, 164 A.2d 467, 474 (Md. 
1960) (holding that mother was criminally negligent when her partner beat her child and caused 
injuries that led to her child’s death); State v. Walden, 293 S.E.2d 780, 787 (N.C. 1982) (upholding a 
conviction of a mother for assault with a dangerous weapon when she failed to take reasonable steps 
to protect her one-year-old son from an assault). 
 23. This analysis does not deal with removal situations where the batterer abused both 
mother and children. However, courts may also unfairly charge a mother criminally for her partner’s 
abuse of her children. See, e.g., In re Maricopa County Juvenile Action Nos. JS-4118/JD-529, 656 
P.2d 1268, 1270 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1983) (applying Arizona statute to hold mother neglectful for failing 
to “defend herself or her children from abuse” and for failing to obtain a divorce from her husband). 
Courts may also terminate a battered mother’s parental rights because she failed to protect the child 
from an abusive father without regard to how she treated the child. See Walden, 293 S.E.2d at 787–
88 (applying North Carolina statute to hold mother guilty of assault because she was present while 
abuse occurred and failed to protect her child); In re J.L.S., 793 S.W.2d 79, 80–82 (Tex. App. 1990); 
Shapley v. Tex. Dep’t of Human Res., 581 S.W.2d 250, 254 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979) (reversing 
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a battered mother to do to protect her children, considering the threat of 
harm by a batterer upon reporting abuse. Courts can only understand the 
reasonableness of a battered mother’s efforts to protect her children from 
witnessing abuse when they understand the coercion that accompanies 
physical abuse in domestic violence.24 
Unfortunately, courts sometimes fail to distinguish between cases 
where children are abused and cases where children witness abuse 
against their mother, which may result in further punishment of the 
mother when she is the victim of abuse.25 Mothers in “coercive 
battering” relationships are often blamed and punished by the state, thus 
strengthening the batterer’s control over the battered mother.26 Such 
 
termination of mother’s parental rights where the father had physically abused their infant and 
mother delayed in reporting the abuse because of a legitimate “fear of her husband”); State v. 
Williquette, 385 N.W.2d 145, 147 (Wis. 1986) (convicting mother of child abuse for leaving her two 
children with her husband who abused the children).  
 24. See supra note 19 for definition of “coercive battering.” Experts claim that men do not 
“lose control” and abuse their wives but often choose to batter women to gain control over their 
partners. See ELIZABETH M. SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN & FEMINIST LAWMAKING 12 (2000); 
Martha R. Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Women: Redefining the Issue of Separation, 90 
MICH. L. REV. 1, 57 (1991). These tactics include punishing partners for disobedience, playing mind 
games on them, leaving them economically vulnerable, and limiting partners’ activities. Evan Stark, 
A Failure to Protect: Unraveling “The Battered Mother’s Dilemma,” 27 W. ST. U. L. REV. 29, 70–
74 (1999); EVE S. BUZAWA ET AL., UNIV. OF MASS. LOWELL, RESPONSE TO DOMESTIC VIOLENCE IN 
A PRO-ACTIVE COURT: FINAL REPORT 75 (1999), cited in Stark, supra, at 57 n.99 (citing study 
illustrating control in domestic violence where, “of 118 victims whose partners were arrested for 
domestic violence, 39.8% reported they were not free to come and go as they pleased, 45.8% were 
denied access to social support, 58.5% were denied access to money, and 46% experienced between 
three and fifteen other restrictions in their daily routines”). These tactics are especially important to 
understanding why battered mothers cannot escape from abusive homes. Batterers may threaten to 
harm the woman or the children or threaten the woman that the state will take her children and hold 
her accountable for the abuse if she leaves him or reports the abuse. Fernandez, supra note 20, at 2. 
In addition, “[b]atterers use the legal system as a new area of combat when they seek to keep their 
wives from leaving.” SCHNEIDER, supra, at 169 (citation omitted). 
 25. In fact, sometimes the treatment by courts and state agencies is reminiscent of the 
blaming and threatening of batterers. See Stark, supra note 24, at 77. One detective interrogating a 
mother, threatened her that “she would never see her children again” unless she admitted that her 
husband had battered her. Id. The mother, reminded of her husband who would also pound on a table 
before he beat her, remembered her husband’s prior threats and admitted to beating her children and 
denied any fault on the part of her battering husband. Id. Sometimes children are removed despite 
the mother’s best efforts to protect them from abuse by her partner. See In re Dalton, 424 N.E.2d 
1226, 1230 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981) (terminating a battered mother’s parental right because her children 
were abused by their father, even though he kidnapped his children back after every escape attempt 
the mother made). 
 26. In Nicholson, ACS threatened and blamed mothers for their batterers’ acts and reinforced 
the control tactics of the batterer. Nicholson v. Williams, 203 F. Supp. 2d 153 (E.D.N.Y. 2002). For 
example, one Nicholson mother whose partner violated a protection order and kidnapped her child 
was blamed by child services for “leaving [her child] with an abusive man.” Id. at 186. The 
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blame and punishment may ultimately cause the mother and child more 
harm since the mother may be less likely to escape the abusive situation 
because of fear that abuse will increase if the state intervenes.27 Not only 
do state agencies sometimes punish mothers for their partner’s acts, but 
state agencies may even grant child custody to abusive fathers.28 Under 
these circumstances, the batterer and the victim are unfairly characterized 
as a single parental unit and the battered mother is punished for her 
partner’s abuse.29 On the other hand, the batterer is treated as an 
 
caseworker also intimidated the mother by telling her that her son now belonged to the state. When 
she protested that she was not at fault and that the judge would give her custody, the caseworker 
replied with surety that “the judge is always on ACS’s side.” Id. 
 27. A battered mother’s expectations that her partner will fulfill his threats to injure or kill 
her upon separation are often fulfilled. Separation between the mother and father increases the 
frequency and severity of threats, assault, and harassment. Separation also dramatically increases 
chances that the woman and her children will be seriously injured, killed, or face retaliation, 
including rape or child abuse. SCHNEIDER, supra note 24, at 115; see also Mary Ann Dutton, 
Understanding Women’s Responses to Domestic Violence: A Redefinition of the Battered Woman 
Syndrome, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1191, 1232–33 (1993); V. Pualani Enos, Prosecuting Battered 
Mothers: State Laws’ Failure to Protect Battered Women and Abused Children, 19 HARV. 
WOMEN’S L.J. 229, 244 (1996) (stating, “[t]he risk of violence that increases after separation 
requires many women to go into hiding” and often women “must completely relocate” to stay safe); 
Symposium, Women, Children and Domestic Violence: Current Tensions and Emerging Issues, 27 
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 567, 585 (2000). 
 28. The abusive partner is often granted custody over his children, even when the court 
explicitly recognizes that the father abused his wife. It is estimated that at least 50% “of all contested 
custody cases involve families with a history of some form of family violence”; in approximately 
40% of the cases, fathers were awarded custody despite their history of violence. Lenore E.A. 
Walker & Glenace E. Edwall, Domestic Violence and Determination of Visitation and Custody in 
Divorce, in DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ON TRIAL: PSYCHOLOGICAL AND LEGAL DIMENSIONS OF FAMILY 
VIOLENCE 127, 130 (Daniel J. Sonkin ed., 1990); see also Mahoney, supra note 24, at 45 (“In one 
study, fifty-nine percent of the judicially successful fathers had physically abused their wives . . . 
[and] thirty-six percent had kidnapped their children.”) (citation omitted). Abusive fathers are even 
favored in custody proceedings when they have severely assaulted and been accused of killing the 
children’s mother. See Simpson v. Brown, 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d 389 (Ct. App. 1998). By this act, the 
threats of battering men that they will obtain custody of the children come to fruition, further 
conveying the message that a battered mother should remain silent about abuse. By granting custody 
to an abusive father, courts suggest that abuse of the mother is only a relationship problem in 
determining a father’s custody but that the abuse indicates neglect in a mother’s custody 
determination. 
 29. In child abuse and neglect cases, parents often are treated as one actor, and non-abusive 
mothers often receive the same sentence and punishment as the individual who committed the illegal 
act. See SCHNEIDER, supra note 24, at 153, 158 n.29; Bernadine Dohrn, Bad Mothers, Good Mothers 
and the State: Children on the Margins, 2 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 1, 5, 7 (1995). However, in 
many cases, the courts rightfully separate the proceedings over parental rights, recognizing that 
parents are autonomous individuals who are capable of controlling themselves. See, e.g., In re Glenn 
G., 587 N.Y.S.2d 464, 470 (Fam. Ct. 1992) (refusing to hold a battered mother liable with her 
husband when she did not cause the harm to the children), aff’d, In re Josephine G., 63 N.Y.S.2d 348 
(App. Div. 1995). 
BAR-ROB PP3 10/21/2003 9:39:53 AM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2003 
108 
independent individual so that his spousal abuse is rarely considered 
when a court grants him custody of his children. 
Such reactions to battering relationships illustrate that state actors 
sometimes violate a battered mother’s Thirteenth and Nineteenth 
Amendment rights. By punishing a woman for her partner’s abuse, state 
actors deny women an autonomous identity and treat them as co-abusers 
with their husbands, when, in fact, the women are not the abusers at all.30 
Also, by punishing a battered mother for abuses committed against her, 
state actors may perpetuate slavery-like conditions by enforcing the 
batterer’s control over the mother, thereby making it less likely that the 
mother will report abuse and more difficult for her to escape. Decreasing 
the likelihood that a battered mother escapes from the abuse helps create 
a slavery-like condition because the woman is coerced into silence and 
into accepting the abuse since she fears retaliation from her partner if she 
reports the abuse.31 The next section illustrates how the Thirteenth and 
Nineteenth Amendments establish battered women’s rights to autonomy 
and freedom from slavery-like conditions. 
III. SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS AND STATE  
REMOVAL OF CHILDREN 
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that 
“[n]o State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law . . . .”32 Substantive due process protects 
individuals from “certain government actions regardless of the fairness 
of the procedures used to implement them . . . .”33 The “right to 
substantive due process conferred by the Fourteenth Amendment 
includes the right to be free from state and local government interference 
with certain constitutionally recognized fundamental rights.”34 One such 
 
 30. Courts and child protection agencies deny women an autonomous identity when they 
punish them for abuse that their partner committed and when they blame battered mothers for 
engaging in domestic violence when the mothers did not abuse but, instead, were abused. See supra 
note 20. 
 31. See supra notes 24, 27. “Coercive battering” can create a slavery-like condition where a 
battered mother is prevented from reporting abuse against her by her partner and is controlled and 
manipulated like a slave. Id.; see also infra Part IV.B. 
 32. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 33. Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986). 
 34. Phillips v. Borough of Keyport, 107 F.3d 164, 179–80 (3d Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 
U.S. 932 (1997); see Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 234 (1972) (holding that the Fourteenth 
Amendment prohibits “the State from compelling respondents to cause their children to attend 
formal high school to age 16”); Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534–35 (1925) (holding that 
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fundamental right is the right to raise one’s child.35 Another is the right 
of a child to be raised and nurtured by his parents.36 However, the 
constitutional right to familial integrity is not absolute.37 Indeed, this 
fundamental right is “limited by the compelling governmental interest in 
the protection of children—particularly where the children need to be 
protected from their own parents.”38  
  In certain narrowly-defined circumstances, the state’s interest in a 
child’s health and welfare may supersede a parent’s fundamental right to 
custody over her children.39 Thus, a balance must be reached between 
the fundamental right to family integrity and the state’s interest in 
protecting children from abuse, especially in cases where children are 
removed from their homes.40 In balancing these competing interests, 
courts have recognized that “a state has no interest in protecting children 
from their parents unless it has some reasonable and articulable evidence 
giving rise to a reasonable suspicion that a child has been abused or is in 
imminent danger of abuse.”41 The substantive due process balance 
requires a state to enforce its compelling interest of protecting children 
while respecting the substantive due process rights of parents.42 
In Nicholson, the court found a substantive due process violation 
because ACS failed to demonstrate that its policy of separation was a 
 
under Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923), “the Act of 1922 unreasonably interferes with the 
liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children under their 
control”); Meyer, 262 U.S. at 401 (noting that “the individual has certain fundamental rights which 
must be respected”). 
 35. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 119–23 (1989) (discussing fundamental right 
of parents to raise children). 
 36. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982) (holding that the “fundamental liberty 
interest of natural parents in the care, custody, and management of their child” is protected by the 
Fourteenth Amendment). 
 37. See Weller v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 392 (4th Cir. 1990) (stating that 
“[s]ubstantive due process does not categorically bar the government from altering parental custody 
rights”). 
 38. Croft v. Westmoreland County Children and Youth Servs., 103 F.3d 1123, 1125 (3d Cir. 
1997). Thus, substantive due process provides the appropriate vehicle for evaluating the 
constitutionality of removal of children from their parents. 
 39. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 652 (1972) (recognizing that because the state has 
cognizable interests in the safety of children in its jurisdiction, “neglectful parents may be separated 
from their children”). 
 40. See Miller v. City of Philadelphia, 174 F.3d 368, 373 (3d Cir. 1999) (“[The] fundamental 
liberty interest of natural parents in the care, custody, and management of their child . . . must be 
balanced against the state’s interest in protecting children suspected of being abused.” (citations 
omitted)). 
 41. Croft, 103 F.3d at 1126. 
 42. Miller, 174 F.3d at 373. 
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compelling state interest before removing children from their natural 
family.43 The court found no compelling state interest when the removals 
actually “adversely affect[ed] the child’s physical and psychic well-
being” and when the ACS “automatically [held] both the abuser and the 
abusee liable as a unit and relie[d] on unfounded presumptions about the 
negative character and abilities of battered women” in removing 
children.44 The Nicholson court also found that the unnecessary removals 
infringed on the mothers’ fundamental parental rights by creating 
suffering and trauma through separation from their children.45 Since 
ACS failed to prove that its policy was a result of a compelling state 
interest and since it violated the mothers’ and children’s right to family 
integrity, the court declared that it violated substantive due process.46 
Although the Nicholson court found a substantive due process 
violation for child removal from battered mothers, battered mothers 
should not be optimistic about pursuing this claim under a traditional 
substantive due process analysis for three reasons. First, many courts are 
wary of substantive due process claims in general because the Supreme 
Court has expressed reservations about expanding the reach of 
substantive due process.47 Accordingly, some courts may reject a 
 
 43. Nicholson v. Williams, 203 F. Supp. 2d 153, 211, 235, 245, 250 (finding “no indication 
that ACS effectively and systematically pursues removal of the abuser before seeking removal of the 
battered victim’s child”). 
 44. Id. at 250. 
 45. Id. at 251 (stating that all “the experts agree[d] that unnecessary removals harm children, 
and that children from homes with domestic violence are particularly sensitive to being separated 
from the non-abusive parent.”). 
 46. Id. 
 47. See Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 288–89 (1994) (Souter, J., concurring) (The “rule of 
reserving due process for otherwise homeless substantial claims” applies in this case, which presents 
“no substantial burden on liberty beyond what the Fourth Amendment is generally thought to 
redress . . . .”); Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 327–28 (1986) (refusing to rely on the Due Process 
Clause when doing so would have duplicated protection that is provided under the Eighth 
Amendment and stating that “the Due Process Clause affords respondent no greater protection than 
does the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause”). 
  Even though Judge Weinstein adopted substantive due process in Nicholson, other judges 
may not be as willing to do so since Weinstein is known for adopting creative solutions to difficult 
problems, solutions that are not widely accepted by the federal judiciary. See Stephen B. Burbank, 
The Courtroom as Classroom: Independence, Imagination and Ideology in the Work of Jack 
Weinstein, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1971 (1997) (arguing that Weinstein is creative as well as unique in 
his judicial approach); Martha Minow, Judge for the Situation: Judge Jack Weinstein, Creator of 
Temporary Administrative Agencies, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 2010, 2010–11, 2015–16 (1997) (noting 
that “Judge Weinstein’s technical rulings often depart from the common practice of courts to use 
procedural rules to sift, narrow, curb, or avoid altogether the lawsuits brought before” them and 
illustrate “a willingness to stretch, if not defy, existing rules”). Critics of Judge Weinstein “charge 
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substantive due process claim of a battered mother for the removal of her 
children as an expansion of a fundamental right.48 Second, courts may 
find that residing in an abusive home or witnessing abuse is an adequate 
reason to remove children from battered mothers, regardless of their role 
in the abuse.49 Also, a finding of a substantive due process violation for 
state actors has often been reserved for egregious state action.50 The 
temporary removal of children from battered mothers that is not intended 
to harm mothers, but to protect children, is likely to be interpreted as 
negligent state action rather than egregious state action.51 Therefore, 
courts will not likely find that temporarily removing children from a non-
abusive mother is egregious state action and therefore not a substantive 
due process violation. Finally, simply using the lens of substantive due 
process to understand child removal from battered women does not treat 
domestic violence any differently than violations of liberty or property, 
which dramatically differ in scope from child removal cases of battered 
mothers and which require less contextual understanding.52 Since 
 
him with departing from the independence and detachment required of a judge because he seeks 
settlements to advance a vision of community values in the public interest” and is “too much the 
advocate.” Id. at 2011. 
 48. Albright, 510 U.S. at 272 (noting that the “guideposts for responsible decision making in 
this unchartered area are scarce and open-ended” (citation omitted)); see also Reno v. Flores, 507 
U.S. 292, 302 (1993) (“The doctrine of judicial self-restraint requires us to exercise the utmost care 
whenever we are asked to break new ground in this field.” (citation omitted)). 
 49. This is especially the case since courts tend to be deferential to caseworkers if they have a 
reasonable basis for removal of children. See Wilkinson v. Russell, 182 F.3d 89, 104 (2d Cir. 1999) 
(holding that as long as “caseworkers have a ‘reasonable basis’ for their findings of abuse,” the 
removal of children does not violate due process). This Comment does not argue that abuse in the 
home is never an adequate reason to remove children or that children are not often benefited by 
removal from an abusive home. It does, however, argue that there must be a particularized finding of 
abuse or neglect in each case. 
 50. Shillingford v. Holmes, 634 F.2d 263, 265 (5th Cir. 1981) (“[N]ot every personal hurt 
[inflicted] by a state officer constitutes a violation of the [F]ourteenth [A]mendment.” (citation 
omitted)); see also Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 330–32 (1986) (stating that the Constitution 
“does not purport to supplant traditional tort law” and that the Due Process Clause is not implicated 
by a negligent act of an official causing unintended loss of or injury to life, liberty, or property). 
 51. This distinction was drawn by S.S. v. McMullen, 225 F.3d 960, 963 (8th Cir. 2000), 
which held that state employees placing a child in the custody of his father even though the father 
was associated with a convicted pedophile “did not rise to the level of egregiousness that is required 
to support an action for a substantive due process violation” and makes “a case for negligence only.” 
 52. See supra Part II. Battering relationships often involve control of a victim through threats 
of violence. Such relationships are often misunderstood by courts and state actors. See supra Part II. 
Courts and state actors often treat the abuser and the victim as a single parental unit by removing the 
children from both the abuser and the victim, simply because the victim was abused. See supra note 
29 and accompanying text. In a non-battering situation where the mother often allows her children to 
witness violence, there may be no due process violation upon removal of the children because of the 
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substantive due process is a broad grant of rights that may be construed 
liberally or strictly depending on the court, it cannot provide the certainty 
or consistency in protecting a battered mother’s right to her children.53 
 The Thirteenth and Nineteenth Amendments provide analytical 
guidance on child removal in domestic violence settings. The analysis 
that follows does not purport to resolve all the challenges faced by 
battered mothers with the traditional substantive due process analysis. 
However, adding a Thirteenth and Nineteenth Amendment analysis to 
the fundamental right of family integrity recognized in the Due Process 
Clause should help alleviate these challenges by adding the fundamental 
rights of autonomy and freedom from slavery-like conditions to the 
substantive due process balance. Before elaborating on how a new 
substantive due process analysis creates a more viable claim for battered 
women, the next section demonstrates the relevance of the Thirteenth 
and Nineteenth Amendments to coercive battering. 
IV. LINKS BETWEEN THE THIRTEENTH AND  
 NINETEENTH AMENDMENTS 
Links between the Thirteenth and Nineteenth Amendments can be 
found in the amendments’ legislative history. These links make joint 
application of the amendments to the Fourteenth Amendment historically 
apt. While the texts of the Thirteenth and Nineteenth Amendments are 
not similar on their face, as voting rights and slavery have little in 
common, the history of the abolitionist movement is very closely linked 
 
state’s interest in protecting children. However, in battering cases, an understanding of the 
complexity of the situation is required for courts and state bodies to recognize that they may be 
violating substantive due process through removal of children from the mother. 
 53. Courts have often rejected women’s substantive due process claims after removal of their 
children by child protective agencies. See Miller v. City of Philadelphia, 174 F.3d 368, 375–76 (3d 
Cir. 1999) (rejecting a mother’s claim for substantive due process when her child was removed 
because the social worker did not “exceed both negligence and deliberate indifference, and reach a 
level of gross negligence or arbitrariness that indeed ‘shocks the conscience’” (citation omitted)); 
Croft v. Westmoreland County Children and Youth Servs., 103 F.3d 1123, 1126 (3d. Cir. 1997) 
(noting that there are cases where a child protective agency is “justified in removing either a child or 
parent from the home, even where later investigation proves no abuse occurred”); Patterson v. 
Armstrong County Children and Youth Servs., 141 F. Supp. 2d 512, 525 (W.D. Pa. 2001) (finding 
no substantive due process violation when a child was temporarily removed from her mother after a 
physical fight). However, substantive due process is certainly alive and applicable in the family 
context. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65, 67–73 (2000) (noting that the Due Process Clause 
“includes a substantive component that ‘provides heightened protection against government 
interference with certain fundamental rights and liberty interests’” and holding that a Washington 
statute allowing broad visitation rights to people other than natural parents violates substantive due 
process rights of a mother (citation omitted)). 
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to the movement for women’s suffrage. During and after the Civil War, 
abolitionists and suffragists worked together to abolish slavery.54 Many 
abolitionists, particularly Elizabeth Cady Stanton and Susan B. Anthony, 
had broader goals of establishing universal equality that included 
women, rather than just abolishing slavery.55 
Besides the union between the suffragist and abolitionist movements, 
congressmen also debated woman suffrage and slavery 
contemporaneously, recognizing the potential effects the Thirteenth 
Amendment would have on traditional marriage.56 In fact, congressional 
debates prior to ratification of the Thirteenth Amendment were strikingly 
similar to those prior to ratification of the Nineteenth Amendment. 
During the Thirteenth Amendment debates, congressmen, noting 
parallels between the status of married women and African slaves, 
considered the potential reach of the term “involuntary servitude” in the 
text of the Thirteenth Amendment to disrupt men’s positions in their 
families.57 Senators voiced concern that if the Thirteenth Amendment 
were enacted, women would also be as free as men: “[A] woman would 
be equal to a man and . . . [a] wife would be equal to her husband and as 
free . . . before the law.”58 Proponents of the Thirteenth Amendment in 
 
 54. Adam Winkler, A Revolution Too Soon: Woman Suffragists and the “Living 
Constitution,” 76 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1456, 1469 (2001) (noting that many of the woman suffragists had 
participated actively in the abolition movement). See generally ELEANOR FLEXNER, CENTURY OF 
STRUGGLE: THE WOMAN’S RIGHTS MOVEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 41 (1975) (observing that 
the woman suffrage and abolitionist movements “nourished and strengthened one another” and that 
many woman suffragists learned to organize and speak in public during the abolitionist movement). 
 55. See generally 2 HISTORY OF WOMAN SUFFRAGE 687–88 (Arno Press, Inc. 1969) 
(Elizabeth Cady Stanton et al. eds., 1882); ELLEN CAROL DUBOIS, THE ELIZABETH CADY 
STANTON—SUSAN B. ANTHONY READER: CORRESPONDENCE, WRITINGS, SPEECHES 78–85 (1981); 
Karin Mika, Self-Reflection Within the Academy: The Absence of Women in Constitutional 
Jurisprudence, 9 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 273, 287–88 (1998). Susan B. Anthony said, “[a]s then 
the slaves who got their freedom must take it over, or under, or through the unjust forms of law, 
precisely so now must women, to get their right to a voice in this Government, take it[.]” HISTORY 
OF WOMAN SUFFRAGE, supra, at 688. With the urgency to push for emancipation of slaves after the 
Civil War, the woman suffrage and abolition movements joined together, and many suffrage leaders 
lost their place at the forefront of the movement. Mika, supra, at 287–88. Woman suffragists delayed 
their lobby for an amendment providing universal equal rights that included women until after the 
war. Id. However, by the time the Thirteenth Amendment was ratified, the woman suffrage 
movement lost momentum as supporters divided after the war, leaving woman suffrage without vital 
support. Id. at 289. 
 56. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1488 (1864). 
 57. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2d Sess. 242 (1865). Representative Cox noted that if 
lawmakers start with public affairs to abolish slavery then it will expand to domestic affairs and 
“change the relation of . . . husband and wife.” Id. 
 58. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1488 (1864). A representative was also worried that 
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the Senate convinced their colleagues that the Thirteenth Amendment 
would not alter the marriage relationship.59 
While legislative history illustrates the link between the Thirteenth 
Amendment and the role of women in the family, later implicated by the 
Nineteenth Amendment, the application of the two amendments to the 
modern context of child removal is not obvious. However, these 
amendments bear on the question of child removal because they 
recognize certain fundamental rights that are infringed when a woman’s 
child is taken from her. As shown below, the Thirteenth Amendment 
guarantees freedom from slavery-like conditions,60 and the Nineteenth 
Amendment guarantees a woman’s right to autonomy.61 These rights, 
established by the amendments, apply in the context of domestic 
violence. 
A. The Nineteenth Amendment: Autonomy for Women in the  
Public and Private Realm 
Coverture was a woman’s condition after traditional marriage in 
which her husband legally had control over her person and estate.62 
Coverture marriage intertwined women’s societal role with marriage, so 
courts often interpreted the gains in independent legal and political rights 
for women as displacing the “bondage” and “disability” of traditional 
marriage.63 Since American jurisprudence evolved from English 
common law, the common law doctrine of coverture has influenced the 
 
Congress would have the power to regulate “domestic slavery” under the term “involuntary 
servitude.” CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2d Sess. 242 (1865). 
 59. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 91 (1865) (statement of Sen. Sumner); see also 
CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2nd Sess. 193 (1865) (statement of Robert Kasson). Although it is clear 
that congressional intent favors a narrow view of the Thirteenth Amendment, later interpretation of 
the Amendment leaves room for a broader application. See infra notes 106–08 and accompanying 
text. 
 60. See infra Part IV.B. 
 61. See infra Part IV.A. 
 62. See Tong v. Marvin, 15 Mich. 60, 64–66 (1866) (explaining that under coverture, the 
husband also had a stronger right to the control and custody of the children of the marriage). 
 63. A wife’s dependence on her husband’s identity was referred to as a “disability of 
coverture,” and traditional marriage was referred to as “bondage” for wives. See Gill v. McKinney, 
205 S.W. 416, 418 (Tenn. 1918) (noting that the Tennessee Married Women’s Act of 1913 
“emancipated” married women by not imposing “any disability or incapacity, on a woman as to the 
ownership, acquisition, or disposition of property of any sort” (emphasis added)), superseded by 
statute as stated by Third Nat’l Bank v. Knobler, 1988 Tenn. App. LEXIS 655 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 
21, 1998); Yonner v. Adams, 167 A.2d 717, 727 (Del. Super. Ct. 1961) (explaining that the common 
law recognized a husband-wife status as one of a “chattel-wife in bondage to her feudal lord”). 
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governance of families in enforcing the idea that husbands had ultimate 
power over the rights of their wives and children.64 Under coverture 
principles, the husband and wife were one entity under the law. The 
husband was the legal head of the family, representing all familial 
interests.65 The common law doctrine of coverture thus restricted a 
married woman to a public identity that was linked to her husband. She 
was represented by her husband in court66 and was not held accountable 
for her own crimes when they were committed in her husband’s 
presence.67 However, prior and concurrent state legislation culminating 
in the ratification of the Nineteenth Amendment changed women’s 
status, providing them with an autonomous legal personality.68 When 
courts abolished the common law principles of coverture, they referred to 
it as “emancipating” women by abolishing common law principles, 
further drawing the link between slavery and women’s legal status.69 
Before women gained the right to vote, they gained the right to 
legally represent themselves with respect to their property.70 State court 
interpretations of the acts granting limited legal rights to women 
foreshadowed the change in status for women that the Nineteenth 
Amendment symbolized. State courts also interpreted gains in the legal 
and political representation of women as freeing the woman from the 
 
 64. Miccio, supra note 20, at 92. 
 65. See Friburk v. Standard Oil Co., 68 N.W. 1090, 1091 (Minn. 1896) (recognizing the 
common law principle that under the law, the “husband is the head of the family”). 
 66. JOAN HOFF, LAW, GENDER, AND INJUSTICE: A LEGAL HISTORY OF U.S. WOMEN 87–90 
(1991); Kristin Collins, Note, When Fathers’ Rights are Mothers’ Duties: The Failure of Equal 
Protection in Miller v. Albright, 109 YALE. L.J. 1669, 1682 (2000) (noting that under coverture, “the 
wife lost the legal rights she had as a feme sole, such as rights to her property and her labor, access to 
courts, and the right to contract independently of her husband”). 
 67. Morton v. State, 209 S.W. 644, 645 (Tenn. 1919) (noting “the rule at common law that a 
married woman was not responsible for crimes committed in the presence of her husband, except 
murder and treason”). 
 68. Reva Siegel posits that when Americans ratified the Nineteenth Amendment and gave 
women the right to vote, they rejected traditional understandings of the family and changed women’s 
role in the public and private sphere. Siegel, supra note 14, at 993, 1007. Siegel develops a synthetic 
reading of the Equal Protection Clause and the Nineteenth Amendment for constitutionally-based 
violence against women claims. Id. at 949. This Comment develops a joint reading of the Due 
Process Clause and the Thirteenth and Nineteenth Amendments. 
 69. See Neuberg v. Bobowicz, 162 A.2d 662, 663–64 (Pa. 1960) (noting that the abolishment 
of the last of the common law principles leads to the “complete and universal emancipation of 
women” from being her “husband’s chattel” in which “[s]he owed him duties much the same as did 
a servant his master”), overruled in part by Hopkins v. Blanco, 320 A.2d 662 (Pa. 1974). 
 70. Such state statutes, enacted during the nineteenth century, were referred to as Married 
Women’s Property Acts. See Gill v. McKinney, 205 S.W. 416, 418 (Tenn. 1918). These acts gave 
women the right to sue, to be sued, to contract, and to own property. Id. 
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common law disabilities of wifehood, thereby establishing broader 
autonomy for women.71 While most congressmen undoubtedly intended 
the Nineteenth Amendment to grant nothing more than voting rights for 
women,72 some courts interpreted the Nineteenth Amendment as 
establishing a woman’s independent legal identity.73 Additionally, over 
time, some states also overturned legislation that assumed that husbands 
and wives were one.74 Most relevant to this Comment, as women gained 
broader public rights, they also gained a right to be held accountable for 
 
 71. In Rosencrantz v. Territory, 5 P. 305, 305–06 (Wash. 1884), the Washington Territory 
Supreme Court interpreted a state statute providing that all “householders” may serve on a grand 
jury in a criminal trial to cover married women. The court commented that the state statute was 
broad enough to “abolish all the disabilities of the wife as a member of the family which had been 
imposed upon her by the common law, and to provide, instead . . . , a new relation between husband 
and wife as members of the family.” Id. at 306. Interestingly, the Rosencrantz court recognized that 
if women are separately represented in the term “household,” this would abolish all of the common 
law disabilities of a wife, namely the fact that a husband must represent his wife under the law. This 
abolition, of course, would mean that wife could represent herself. The Rosencrantz court noted that 
the right to independent representation would not only allow women to serve on juries but would 
also alter relations between husbands and wives under the common law by providing women with an 
independent public identity. Id. at 306–07. Rosencrantz was overruled three years later. See Harland 
v. Territory, 13 P. 453, 455 (Wash. 1887). 
 72. The public debate over woman suffrage became known as “the woman question” and 
caused discussion among political leaders about resulting effects on the family. Siegel, supra note 
14, at 950–51. The heated debates about woman suffrage largely came in the family context because 
voting was one way that men indirectly represented women and children in public, and some 
congressmen interpreted granting women an independent vote as a disruption of the traditional 
balance in the family and an end to marriage as an institution. Id. However, suffragists argued that 
men could not rightfully represent women in public and brought to light abuses by male 
representatives such as rape and domestic violence. Id. at 992. 
 73. The Supreme Court in Adkins v. Children’s Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923), overruled in 
part by West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937), held that the Nineteenth Amendment 
embodied a “sex equality norm” and was an “emancipation from the traditions of reasoning about 
gender embodied in the common law of marital status.” Siegel, supra note 14, at 1013. Adkins, 
which struck down a sex-based minimum wage law due to sex inequality, noted that “revolutionary” 
changes had taken place in the status of women “culminating in the Nineteenth Amendment.” 261 
U.S. at 553. The Court then noted that women must be “accorded emancipation from the old 
doctrine that she must be given special protection or be subjected to special restraint in her 
contractual and civil relationships.” Id. The “old doctrine” referred to by the Court refers to the 
traditions of coverture that previously restricted a woman’s liberty due to her relationship to her 
husband. Id. In the years following Adkins, courts interpreted the Nineteenth Amendment to signify 
the abandonment of coverture principles, allowing wives to have criminal liability for their own acts, 
holding that they would be able to establish their own residence, apart from their husband, for tax 
and voting purposes, and restricting other coverture concepts of the common law. Siegel, supra note 
14, at 1016–17. At first, some courts interpreted the Nineteenth Amendment to establish autonomy 
for women from legal representation by their husbands, but it was soon interpreted as an amendment 
about voting, with no bearing on broader issues of women’s citizenship. Id. at 953. 
 74. See, e.g., infra note 75. 
BAR-ROB PP3 10/21/2003 9:39:53 AM 
nnn] Tipping the Balance in Favor of Justice 
 117 
their own crimes.75 Slowly, with the recognition of women’s autonomy, 
many “disabilities” of the old doctrine of coverture marriage were 
abolished.76 Even though the text and legislative history of the 
Nineteenth Amendment do not explicitly embody the principle of legal 
autonomy for women, court opinions interpreting the Nineteenth 
Amendment support the idea that the concept of autonomy is implicit in 
the amendment. 
B. Parallels Between Slavery and Coercive Battering  
Shed Light on the Thirteenth Amendment 
Coercive battering creates conditions like slavery that justify 
application of the Thirteenth Amendment. Batterers use beatings, threats, 
and coercion to control their victims. Similar tactics were used by slave 
masters to manipulate slave service as well as to deny autonomy to free 
blacks after the Civil War.77 Battered women are, of course, not 
physically and legally bound to a master who owns them. However, the 
Thirteenth Amendment encompasses conditions “akin to . . . slavery,”78 
 
 75. Morton v. State, 209 S.W. 644, 645 (Tenn. 1919) (emancipating women from the 
disability of coverture in relation to being held criminally liable under Tennessee law for their own 
criminal acts). 
 76. See, e.g., Detroit Newspaper Indus. Credit Union v. McDonald, 156 N.W.2d 62, 65 
(Mich. Ct. App. 1967) (holding that a phrase in the first sentence of the Michigan Constitution of 
1963 stating that “disabilities of coverture as to property are abolished” prohibits a woman from 
using coverture as a defense). 
 77. See supra Part II. The parallel between slavery and domestic violence was noted in 
congressional hearings on the Violence Against Women Act. Professor Neuborne said that 
“[g]ender-motivated violence is a . . . form of physical subordination that tracks the badges and 
incidents of slavery and involuntary servitude,” while encouraging Congress to “apply the moral 
imperative of the Thirteenth Amendment to the victims of gender-based violence.” See Violence 
Against Women: Victims of the System: Hearing on S. 15 Before the Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d 
Cong. 89–90 (1992) (statement of Burt Neuborne). 
 78. For example, the Supreme Court has held that “compulsory labor akin to African slavery” 
is abolished by the Thirteenth Amendment. Butler v. Perry, 240 U.S. 328, 332 (1916); see also 
Pollock v. Williams, 322 U.S. 4, 17 (1944) (“The undoubted aim of the Thirteenth Amendment as 
implemented by the Anti-peonage Act was not merely to end slavery but to maintain a system of 
completely free and voluntary labor throughout the United States.”). A broader definition of slavery 
in the context of Section 1 of the Thirteenth Amendment is “[a] power relation of domination, 
degradation, and subservience, in which human beings are treated as chattel, not persons.” Amar & 
Widawsky, supra note 14, at 1365. Slavery has not been limited to forced labor. See Griffin v. 
Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 105 (1971) (holding that the Thirteenth Amendment expands to 
“varieties of private conduct . . . beyond the actual imposition of slavery or involuntary servitude” 
and stating that “[b]y the Thirteenth Amendment, we committed ourselves as a Nation to the 
proposition that the former slaves and their descendants should be forever free”); Jones v. Alfred H. 
Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 443–44 (1968) (upholding the use of the Thirteenth Amendment to 
guarantee equal property rights to blacks and whites and noting that the “end is legitimate . . . 
BAR-ROB PP3 10/21/2003 9:39:53 AM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2003 
118 
and coercive battering qualifies as such because batterers physically and 
psychologically control their victims.79 Viewing coercive battering in the 
same context as slavery evidences the severity of threats and physical 
violence faced by some battered mothers and the obstacles they confront 
in escaping these situations.80 Although for some abolitionists the 
Thirteenth Amendment was the result of a struggle for universal 
equality,81 the text of the Thirteenth Amendment does not single out 
women and children.82 Nevertheless, early Supreme Court Thirteenth 
Amendment opinions discuss the application of the Thirteenth 
Amendment to all those who suffer conditions similar to African 
slavery.83 The Supreme Court noted in several cases that abolishing 
slavery was intended to “establish [] universal freedom”84 and was to be 
a denunciation of a “condition” reaching “every race” and every 
individual rather than a declaration in favor of a particular people.85 
 
because it is defined by the Constitution itself. The end is the maintenance of freedom . . . . A man 
who enjoys the civil rights mentioned in this bill cannot be reduced to slavery.” (citation omitted)); 
United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629, 640 (1883) (noting that “besides abolishing slavery and 
involuntary servitude,” the Thirteenth Amendment “gives power to Congress to protect all persons 
within the jurisdiction of the United States from being in any way subjected to slavery or involuntary 
servitude, except as a punishment for crime, and in the enjoyment of that freedom which it was the 
object of the amendment to secure”). 
 79. See supra Part II. 
 80. See infra Part IV.B.1. 
 81. See supra notes 53–54 and accompanying text. 
 82. See supra note 7 (text of the Thirteenth Amendment). 
 83. For general intent to prohibit conditions akin to slavery under the Thirteenth Amendment, 
see Butler v. Perry, 240 U.S. at 332–33. 
 84. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20 (1883). Although the term “universal freedom” used in 
the Civil Rights Cases does not necessarily have gender connotations, it is strikingly reminiscent of 
“universal equality” that some abolitionists sought with the ratification of the Thirteenth 
Amendment. While there has been no reference to gender in court discussions of universal freedom, 
the principle logically covers some women who experience slavery-like conditions at the hands of 
battering partners. 
 85. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 70 (1873), superseded by statute as stated in United 
States v. Ruiz, 961 F. Supp. 1524 (D. Utah 1997). Emphasizing the reach of the Amendment, the 
Court referred to the Thirteenth Amendment as a “grand yet simple declaration of the personal 
freedom of all the human race . . . .” Id. at 69. The Civil Rights Cases interpreted the Thirteenth 
Amendment to authorize Congress to abolish not only chattel slavery but also to “pass all laws 
necessary and proper for abolishing all badges and incidents of slavery . . . .” 109 U.S. at 20. 
However, the Civil Rights Cases also suggested that “badges and incidents of slavery” might be a 
narrow category because the Court found that the Thirteenth Amendment did not give Congress the 
power to “adjust what may be called the social rights of men and races in the community.” Id. at 22. 
Nevertheless, the court did interpret the Amendment “to secure to all citizens of every race and 
color . . . those fundamental rights which are the essence of civil freedom, namely, the same right to 
make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to inherit, purchase, lease, sell and 
convey property, as is enjoyed by white citizens.” Id. 
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Since Thirteenth Amendment precedent indicates that the amendment 
applies to every individual suffering conditions similar to slavery, some 
battered women may qualify for Thirteenth Amendment protection.86 
1. The connection between slavery and violence 
There is widespread agreement among historians that slavery 
involves “permanent, violent domination of . . . generally dishonored 
persons.”87 In addition to the violent coercion that is commonly 
associated with slavery, including deprivation, beating, whipping, rape, 
murder, and starvation, masters also coerced slaves into various types of 
service by using the threat of violence as well as the threat of removing 
children.88 Although there is no evidence of congressional discussion 
about the sexual exploitation of African slaves, there is evidence that the 
Thirteenth Amendment, which banned “anything with the characteristics 
of chattel slavery,” prohibited coerced sexual service.89 Masters provided 
slaves with an added incentive to obey by threatening African slave 
mothers with the constant threat of separation from children and other 
family members.90 
Even after the abolition of slavery, violence against former slaves 
continued and was used to prevent the former slaves from exercising 
their newly obtained civil rights. After the Civil War, southern states 
instituted the Black Codes, which perpetuated the master-slave 
relationship to the “extent that . . . freedom was of little value” for 
 
 86. Sethy v. Alameda County Water Dist., 545 F.2d 1157, 1163 (9th Cir. 1976) (holding that 
42 U.S.C. § 1981, which gives all persons equal rights to the full benefits of all the laws, has been 
“liberally construed to effectuate the purpose of the Thirteenth Amendment”); see also Butler, 240 
U.S. at 332 (recognizing that the undoubted aim of the Thirteenth Amendment was not merely to end 
slavery but “to cover those forms of compulsory labor akin to African slavery which in practical 
operation would tend to produce like undesirable results,” while holding that services performed for 
the state do not constitute involuntary servitude). 
 87. ORLANDO PATTERSON, SLAVERY AND SOCIAL DEATH: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 13 
(1982) (emphasis omitted) (noting that violence is one of the three elements of slavery); DAVID 
BRION DAVIS, SLAVERY AND HUMAN PROGRESS 11 (1984) (citing Patterson in explaining that 
slavery is primarily a “relationship of power and dominion originating in and sustained by 
violence”). 
 88. Nicholson v. Williams, 203 F. Supp. 2d 153, 168–69 (E.D.N.Y. 2002). 
 89. McConnell, supra note 19, at 219 (noting that “[t]he word ‘slavery’ itself evoked a shared 
national consciousness of its horrors, including sexual exploitation for the pleasure of slave-owners 
and their financial benefit” and also was “best understood as the absolute control by white 
slaveholders over all aspects of the lives of their slaves”). 
 90. Id. at 220 n.59. 
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blacks.91 Even after the Thirteenth Amendment was ratified, violence 
was directed at free blacks who attempted to exercise the rights and 
habits of free persons.92 The year after the ratification of the Thirteenth 
Amendment in December 1865, there was a wave of brutal, racially 
motivated violence against Southern blacks.93 This post-Civil War 
violence against blacks illustrates that whites used private violence in an 
effort “to return freed slaves to a subjugated status” and discouraged free 
slaves from exercising their civil rights.94 
Much of the coercion and violence witnessed in master-slave 
relationships is also prominent in battering relationships.95 Conceding 
that there are obvious differences between the actual system of slavery 
and battering relationships, it can still be argued that some battered 
women endure slavery-like conditions and deserve the protection of the 
Thirteenth Amendment. The parallels between slavery and violence 
provide insight into coercive battering relationships where the husband 
uses threats and violence to obtain control and services.96 Like the slave 
owners of African slavery, batterers often use violence to maintain 
control over their victims and ensure that they remain in a subjugated 
 
 91. See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 70 (1873), superseded by statute as stated in 
United States v. Ruiz, 961 F. Supp. 1524 (D. Utah 1997); DONALD G. NIEMAN, TO SET THE LAW IN 
MOTION: THE FREEDMEN’S BUREAU AND THE LEGAL RIGHTS OF BLACKS, 1865–1868, at 73–98 
(1979) (explaining that the Black Codes passed apprenticeship laws, labor contract laws, vagrancy 
laws, and restrictive travel laws). 
 92. ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA’S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION 1863–1877, at 
120 (1988). “The pervasiveness of violence [against blacks after the Civil War] reflected whites’ 
determination to define [freedom in their own way,] . . . in matters of family, church, labor, or 
personal demeanor.” Id. at 120. It sometimes included the beating or killing of blacks “for such 
‘infractions’ as failing to step off sidewalks, objecting to beatings of their children, addressing 
whites without deference, and attempting to vote.” RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND THE 
LAW 39 (1997). 
 93. FONER, supra note 92, at 119–20. 
 94. See United States v. Nelson, 277 F.3d 164, 190 (2d Cir. 2002). Nelson cited studies of 
post-Civil War violence to demonstrate that  
there exist indubitable connections (a) between slavery and private violence directed 
against despised and enslaved groups and, more specifically, (b) between American 
slavery and private violence and (c) between post Civil War efforts to return freed slaves 
to a subjugated status and private violence directed at interfering with and discouraging 
the freed slaves’ exercise of civil rights in public places.  
Id.  
 95. See supra notes 24, 27 and accompanying text. 
 96. See supra note 77. In addition to being subject to physical violence, which was used 
against African slaves to obtain economically productive labor, slaves were also required to provide 
reproductive and sexual services for their masters. McConnell, supra note 19, at 217–18. 
BAR-ROB PP3 10/21/2003 9:39:53 AM 
nnn] Tipping the Balance in Favor of Justice 
 121 
status.97 Just like slave masters, batterers physically abuse and degrade 
their victims to demonstrate their dominance and to obtain sexual 
“services” by force.98 Slavery and coercive battering both rely upon 
humiliation to remind the slave or battered woman of who is in control.99 
In addition, just as violence against freed blacks increased during the 
post-Civil War era,100 violence against battered women often increases 
after they leave their batterers.101 As with slave masters after the Civil 
War, the batterer often threatens the life of the woman or her children 
and uses violence to bring her back under his control.102 The violence 
and coercion used by both batterers and slave masters illustrate that 
coercive battering should be viewed as a slavery-like condition.103 
2. Section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment 
Section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment has often been used to 
prohibit slavery-like conditions, even though the Thirteenth Amendment 
is an absolute prohibition of slavery that requires no additional state 
 
 97. SCHNEIDER, supra note 24, at 115 (noting that “male physical violence is part of a larger 
framework of power and coercive control over women, which includes restriction of fundamental 
rights of freedom, choice, and autonomy”). 
 98. McConnell, supra note 19, at 217–18. 
 99. See supra notes 19, 24. Batterers use violence as well as mind tricks and other 
humiliating tactics to control their partners. See supra notes 19, 24. 
 100. Some former slave owners used violence against their former slaves to stop them from 
leaving their plantations. See generally CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 339–40 (1866) 
(statement of Sen. Wilson) (noting that the purpose of The Freedmen’s Bureau was to prevent post-
Civil War violence against blacks); FONER, supra note 92, at 119–23 (discussing post-Civil War 
violence against free blacks and the anger of Southern whites when they were not treated with the 
same deference as they were “accustomed to” under slavery). 
 101. See supra note 27. Although it is possible that there are independent reasons that violence 
increases after a slave is freed as well as after a battered woman leaves her partner, since there are 
documented similarities in the coercion existing in both relationships, there is a likelihood that the 
violence upon separation is likely to be linked as well. 
 102. See supra note 27. 
 103. JAMES OAKES, SLAVERY AND FREEDOM: AN INTERPRETATION OF THE OLD SOUTH 4, 6 
(1990) (“[V]iolence was a universal characteristic of slavery. For good reason, the master’s whip has 
long served as a ubiquitous symbol of slavery everywhere.”). In addition, “[r]acism and violence 
were closely linked. . . . [as] black slaves were deemed inherently more responsive than whites to the 
motivating force of physical coercion . . . .” Andrew E. Taslitz, Hate Crimes, Free Speech, and the 
Contract of Mutual Indifference, 80 B.U. L. REV. 1283, 1327 (2000). Obedience was central to 
slavery and its importance was “absolutely central” to Southern literature. Id. at 1327–28 (noting that 
“[t]he Farmers’ Register counseled masters that slaves ‘must obey at all times, and under all 
circumstances. . . . [and that u]nconditional submission is the only footing upon which slavery 
should be placed’” (citation omitted)). 
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action for enforcement.104 This section grants Congress power to enforce 
the Thirteenth Amendment “by appropriate legislation.”105 In recent 
years, the Thirteenth Amendment has been enforced through federal 
criminal statutes enacted to abolish the “badges and incidents” of slavery 
as well as involuntary servitude,106 but no additional state legislation is 
required. Therefore, no separate federal criminal statute abolishing 
domestic violence is necessary to apply the Thirteenth Amendment to 
coercive battering in the context of substantive due process. Furthermore, 
examining the reach of the Thirteenth Amendment under Section 2 
illustrates that the Amendment has been expanded from American 
slavery to other contexts. 
While the Supreme Court has not spoken on whether “badges and 
incidents of slavery” were prohibited by the text of the Thirteenth 
Amendment, several courts, including the Second Circuit Court of 
Appeals, have held that Congress may, under the Section 2 enforcement 
power, adopt legislation designed to eliminate the “badges and incidents” 
of slavery, which include various forms of discrimination.107 
In United States v. Nelson, the Second Circuit recently declared that 
a federal statute outlawing violence motivated by race or religion 
properly prohibited violence as a “badge or incident of slavery” under 
the Thirteenth Amendment.108 In Nelson, a man who assaulted a random 
 
 104. See Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20 (1883). Since coercive battering is a slavery-like 
condition, some commentators have argued that battered women deserve a private right of action 
against their batterers under the text of the Thirteenth Amendment. See generally Sally F. Goldfarb, 
“No Civilized System of Justice”: The Fate of the Violence Against Women Act, 102 W. VA. L. REV. 
499 (2000). However, to date, no court has found a private right under Section 1 of the Thirteenth 
Amendment for enduring slavery-like conditions. In addition, the Supreme Court has not decided 
whether to broaden the reach of the Thirteenth Amendment to “badges and incidents of slavery” or 
racial discrimination. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 439 (1968) (declining to decide 
whether the Thirteenth Amendment abolished badges and incidents of slavery as well as actual 
slavery). 
 105. See supra note 7 (text of the Thirteenth Amendment). 
 106. One of these statutes is 18 U.S.C. § 1584 (2000), which prohibits selling or maintaining 
an individual in involuntary servitude. It has been used most often in the employment context to 
prohibit forced agricultural labor and domestic or sexual service. 
 107. United States v. Nelson, 277 F.3d 164, 164, 181, 184–85 (2d Cir. 2002), notes that it is 
“clear from many decisions of the Supreme Court that Congress may, under its Section Two 
enforcement power,” now prohibit conduct besides actual slavery and involuntary servitude, 
including various forms of discrimination. 
 108. Even the Nelson dissent agreed with the majority conclusion that “Congress’s power to 
enforce the elimination of slavery in this country is not limited to enslavement, or its badges and 
incidents, by virtue of race.” Id. at 214. The dissent further indicated that since the Thirteenth 
Amendment makes no reference to race, and because “throughout history enslavement has occurred 
without regard to race . . . the Thirteenth Amendment is not limited to slavery that is imposed by 
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Jewish couple walking on a predominantly Jewish street was charged 
with violating 18 U.S.C. § 245(b)(2)(B), which prohibits violent acts 
against individuals using public facilities on the basis of race or 
religion.109 The court found that the statute comfortably fit within 
Congress’s power to enforce the Thirteenth Amendment as a “badge or 
incident of slavery,”110 even though it targeted religiously-based 
violence as well as race-based violence.111 
The court further noted that although the Thirteenth Amendment was 
enacted in the historical context of American slavery, which applied 
almost exclusively to African Americans, the “text of the Amendment 
nowhere identifies or otherwise singles out those whose servitude the 
Amendment had specifically been enacted to address.”112 In holding that 
the Thirteenth Amendment applies to violence against religious groups, 
the court stated that “there is nothing in the conceptual or linguistic 
structure of the prohibition of ‘slavery’ and ‘involuntary servitude’—
which appears in the Thirteenth Amendment, . . . that limits the banning 
of these evils only when they are imposed along racial lines.”113 The 
court, emphasizing that the Thirteenth Amendment does not include the 
adjective “racial” in front of slavery, found it was broad enough to cover 
religious violence.114 
Since religious violence qualifies for Thirteenth Amendment 
protection as a “badge or incident of slavery,” gender violence should 
 
virtue of race.” Id. 
 109. Id. at 170–71. 
 110. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 22 (1883) (suggesting that “badges and incidents of 
slavery” might be a narrow category). Because of this narrow interpretation of “badges and incidents 
of slavery” that limited the Amendment to slavery alone, some courts may feel justified in not 
extending the protection of the Thirteenth Amendment to battered women. See id. at 20–22. 
 111. Nelson, 277 F.3d at 179–80 n.15. The court held that Congress’s power under the 
Thirteenth Amendment extends to enacting legislation regulating private conduct. Id. at 176 (citation 
omitted). See also Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 179 (1976) (holding that the power granted to 
Congress by the Thirteenth Amendment includes the power to regulate the acts of individuals), 
superseded by statute as stated by Clark v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., No. 77-1251 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 1, 
1993). But several courts have also concluded that there is no direct, independent cause of action 
under the Thirteenth Amendment. See Sanders v. A.J. Canfield Co., 635 F. Supp. 85, 87 (N.D. Ill. 
1986); Westray v. Porthole, Inc., 586 F. Supp. 834, 838–39 (D. Md. 1984); Vietnamese Fishermen’s 
Ass’n v. Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, 518 F. Supp. 993, 1012 (S.D. Tex. 1981). 
 112. Nelson, 277 F.3d at 176. The Supreme Court held early on that “although ‘negro slavery 
alone was in the mind of the Congress which proposed the thirteenth article, it forbids any other kind 
of slavery, now or hereafter,’ and would apply equally to ‘Mexican peonage or the Chinese coolie 
labor system.’” Id. (citation omitted). 
 113. Id. at 179. 
 114. Id. at 179–80. 
BAR-ROB PP3 10/21/2003 9:39:53 AM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2003 
124 
also qualify.115 Considering the history of the Thirteenth Amendment 
and its goal of “universal freedom” as well as the Amendment’s link to 
woman suffrage, courts may appropriately recognize that the Thirteenth 
Amendment applies to gender violence. Additionally, Thirteenth 
Amendment involuntary servitude may also apply to women forced to 
perform “compulsory labor akin to African slavery . . . .”116 Section 2 of 
the Thirteenth Amendment has been used to ban involuntary servitude in 
the employment and religion contexts where individuals have been held 
or forced to perform labor against their will.117 Since the Supreme Court 
has not eliminated the use of involuntary servitude precedent in the 
family context, lower courts may properly apply the Thirteenth 
Amendment in a coercive battering situation where a battered mother has 
faced child removal.118 
Courts have found involuntary servitude in Thirteenth Amendment 
cases where physical violence rather than psychological coercion is used 
to obtain servitude.119 The line of cases dealing with criminal 
 
 115. Both race and gender are considered suspect classes that deserve heightened scrutiny 
under the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause. J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 
127, 128–29 (1994). 18 U.S.C § 245(b)(2)(B) (2000) creates a federal remedy for any person who by 
force or threat interferes with an individual’s participation in a “service . . . provided or administered 
by any State . . . .” Some of the Nicholson mothers who had their children removed may have been 
able to maintain a § 245 claim because a disproportionate majority of mothers were African 
American and faced interference by state employees from obtaining services provided by the state 
for their children. However, it may have been difficult for the mothers to prove that they were 
prevented from using a state service because of their race rather than their status as battered mothers. 
 116. See Butler v. Perry, 240 U.S. 328, 332 (1916). Nevertheless, courts have held that the 
Thirteenth Amendment was not intended to disrupt “military and naval enlistments, or to disturb the 
right of parents and guardians to the custody of their minor children or wards.” See Robertson v. 
Baldwin 165 U.S. 275, 282 (1897). 
 117. Modern-day examples of involuntary servitude include labor camps, child abuse within 
isolated religious sects, or forced confinement. See, e.g., United States v. King, 840 F.2d 1276, 
1278–80 (6th Cir. 1988) (finding that members of the House of Judah, a religious sect, violated 18 
U.S.C. § 1584 when they “repeatedly used and threatened to use physical force to make the children 
[at their camp] perform labor and . . . the children believed they had no viable alternative but to 
perform such labor”), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 894 (1988); United States v. Booker, 655 F.2d 562, 563, 
566 (4th Cir. 1981) (holding that owners of a migrant labor camp violated 18 U.S.C. § 1583’s 
prohibition of involuntary servitude where they forbade workers from leaving without paying their 
debts and enforced the rule by threats of physical harm and physical injury and by forcefully 
returning workers who attempted to leave). 
 118. The Thirteenth Amendment may be a viable option for battered women who are coerced 
to provide services against their will. The modern-day enslavement of some battered women is 
similar to involuntary servitude in the employment context. The biggest difference between these 
cases is that battered women are enslaved by a husband or boyfriend rather than an employer. 
 119. For examples of psychological coercion, see Garcia v. United States, 421 F.2d 1231, 
1232 (5th Cir. 1970) (explaining that ordering taxpayers to pay taxes and penalties to United States 
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involuntary servitude between an employer and employee is relevant in a 
coercive battering context because criminal and civil Thirteenth 
Amendment cases use the same definition of involuntary servitude and 
usually involve similar conditions.120 Criminal involuntary servitude 
cases parallel coercive battering and are thus a useful guide to proper 
analysis of involuntary servitude in the family context. 
The Court in United States v. Kozminski held that under the 
Thirteenth Amendment, physical or legal coercion is necessary for 
finding involuntary servitude between employer and employee.121 
Justice Brennan concurred in this judgment but suggested that 
involuntary servitude prohibits any means of coercion that succeeds in 
breaking another’s will such that he or she is reduced to a condition of 
servitude resembling that of a chattel slave.122 In explaining why 
psychological coercion was too broad, Justice Brennan used the 
examples of coercion by an impassioned religious leader, a threatening 
employer, and an oppressive husband.123 In distinguishing psychological 
threats by a husband against his wife from a physical “beating,” Justice 
Brennan implied that if the husband’s threats were accompanied by 
physical and legal force, then it would fall under the definition of 
involuntary servitude.124 Since Justice Brennan used examples outside 
the employment context to properly define “involuntary servitude,” his 
concurrence suggests that involuntary servitude can occur between 
individuals other than an employer and employee.125 While Justice 
Brennan’s concurrence actually spelled out the possibility of involuntary 
 
government does not violate the Thirteenth Amendment), and Clark v. Clark, 278 S.W. 65, 68 
(Tenn. 1925) (holding that court-ordered alimony payments do not violate the Thirteenth 
Amendment). 
 120. The Supreme Court has held that the term “involuntary servitude” as used in one of the 
federal criminal statutes enforcing the Thirteenth Amendment has the same meaning as it does under 
the Thirteenth Amendment. In United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931 (1988), the Supreme Court 
held that the phrase “involuntary servitude” in 18 U.S.C. § 1584 “clearly was borrowed from the 
Thirteenth Amendment[,]” therefore, rendering it “logical, if not inevitable” that Congress intended 
the phrase to have the same meaning in both places. Id. at 944–45. 
 121. Id. at 952–53 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
 122. Id. at 952–55 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
 123. Id. at 960 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
 124. Id. 
 125. No case law addresses whether the relationship between husband and wife can be 
precluded from a Thirteenth Amendment analysis; however, a strict textualist would not adopt this 
type of argument because it requires a broad interpretation of the Thirteenth Amendment. See 
generally ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION, FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 
(1997). 
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servitude existing within a physically abusive family, as long as there is 
physical or legal coercion, the Kozminski majority leaves this issue 
unanswered. 
Kozminski and other involuntary servitude cases in the employment 
context inform the discussion of involuntary servitude in the context of 
domestic violence. Involuntary servitude may arise in a relationship that 
initially was freely entered into.126 In addition, where coercive battering 
exists, the fact that an individual held in involuntary servitude fails to 
take advantage “of an opportunity to escape” does not indicate that the 
person was not held in involuntary servitude.127 
An employee used threats and coercion against a domestic servant in 
United States v. Ingalls, where the servant entered into the employment 
voluntarily.128 In Ingalls, a servant was forced by her employers to 
perform household labor without wages or any vacation time.129 She was 
physically abused at times, threatened with imprisonment, and 
blackmailed with information of an adulterous relationship and an illegal 
abortion.130 The domestic worker believed the threats and remained 
against her free will.131 She was isolated from her friends and unable to 
leave the house except on errands. She escaped once, but after the 
employer renewed the threats, the domestic worker returned to the 
home.132 In determining that the domestic worker was held in 
involuntary servitude, the court did not find it relevant that the domestic 
worker freely moved to the home, was at times able to leave the house, 
or even returned after escaping once. Even though the worker was not 
physically trapped in the house, the court convicted the family of 
inducing the domestic worker to move into the home with the intent to 
keep her as a slave.133 
 
 126. McConnell, supra note 19, at 225–26. 
 127. Id. at 226. 
 128. 73 F. Supp. 76, 77 (S.D. Cal. 1947). 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. at 77–78. 
 133. Id. at 77; see also United States v. Booker, 655 F.2d 562, 562 (4th Cir. 1981) (upholding 
involuntary servitude conviction for operator of a migrant agricultural labor camp where employers 
withheld wages, openly displayed guns, and physically abused and threatened employees if they 
attempted escape); Bernal v. United States, 241 F. 339, 341–42 (5th Cir. 1917) (holding that a 
foreign domestic worker was held in involuntary servitude when the hotel she was recruited to work 
for turned out to be a prostitution house, even though she came to the hotel voluntarily, was allowed 
to leave the hotel for errands, and wrote a letter to a relative during her time of isolation). 
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Although many of the involuntary servitude cases take place in the 
employee-employer context, the physical violence and coercion taking 
place in these cases is not generally more severe or frequent than that 
involved in many cases of coercive battering.134 However, since the 
banning of slavery with the Thirteenth Amendment signified the banning 
of slavery-like conditions, severe battering relationships fit within this 
context. 
One striking similarity between employers and batterers who inflict 
involuntary servitude on their victims is that they both physically 
threaten their victim and enforce these threats through physical abuse.135 
The threats, abuse, and forced labor endured by many battered women 
are as serious, if not more serious, than those endured by the employee in 
Ingalls. In both contexts, women were threatened, physically abused, and 
sometimes forced to provide services involuntarily.136 That the servitude 
for the battered woman occurs with a domestic partner rather than a boss 
and that the battered woman performs unpaid work does not negate the 
fact that the labor is coerced by physical force.137 In addition, batterers 
employ tactics of intimidation, threats, and physical abuse used by 
employers convicted of involuntary servitude.138 
Thus, under the Section 2 “badges and incidents” and involuntary 
servitude cases, several principles are revealed that are relevant to 
battered mothers. First, since the Thirteenth Amendment intended to ban 
all conditions akin to slavery and since it has been held to ban violent 
forms of religious discrimination, the Amendment may also be extended 
to cover gender violence.139 Second, the fact that a battered mother 
voluntarily entered into a battering relationship has no bearing on 
whether she was held in involuntary servitude, and like a domestic 
worker, she should not be punished for the initial undertaking of the 
 
 134. See McConnell, supra note 19, at 209 n.13. 
 135. See supra notes 24, 27. In State v. Norman, 366 S.E.2d 586, 587 (N.C. Ct. App. 1988), 
rev’d, 378 S.E.2d 233 (N.C. 1988), a batterer abused his wife physically and forced her to prostitute 
herself. He beat her almost every day for over twenty years, withheld food from her, extinguished 
cigarettes on her skin, made her eat dog food, and threatened to kill her and mutilate her body. Id. 
When she tried to leave he brought her back and beat her. Id. She believed she could not escape and 
feared his retaliation for her attempts. Id. at 589. The battered woman’s expert testified that her 
situation was like that of a “prisoner of war” and that the only means of escape she could see was to 
kill him. Id. at 587–89. 
 136. McConnell, supra note 19, at 231–32. 
 137. Id. at 231. 
 138. See supra notes 24, 27 and accompanying text. 
 139. See supra notes 82, 106 and accompanying text. 
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relationship.140 Third, threats of physical violence against battered 
women should be interpreted as an adequate restraint on the battered 
women’s ability to escape, even though it may be physically possible for 
them to do so.141 These three principles contribute to the creation of a 
substantive due process analysis that incorporates both the Thirteenth 
and Nineteenth Amendments. 
 
V. ADDING THE THIRTEENTH AND NINETEENTH AMENDMENTS TO THE 
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO FAMILY INTEGRITY 
The principles extracted from the Nineteenth and Thirteenth 
Amendments create an improved Fourteenth Amendment due process 
analysis for use in claims by battered mothers. This analysis tips the 
balance of interests in favor of justice to battered mothers and protection 
of the state’s compelling interest of protecting children. While other 
courts may follow Nicholson’s lead and find that the Due Process Clause 
alone justifies battered mothers’ claims against child removal, judges’ 
wariness in expanding rights under substantive due process and some 
courts’ tendency to blame victims of abuse calls for a stronger 
constitutional basis for battered mothers’ claims against child 
removal.142 This stronger constitutional basis may be provided by adding 
the Thirteenth and Nineteenth Amendments to the substantive due 
process analysis. 
The following three principles revealed from the forgoing review of 
the Thirteenth and Nineteenth Amendments may justify alteration of the 
traditional substantive due process analysis. First, conditions akin to 
slavery, which are prohibited under the Thirteenth Amendment, exist 
within the coercive battering context. Battered women are often trapped 
by batterers’ violence and threats of physical and legal force against 
them and their children. The substantive due process violations involved 
 
 140. See supra notes 127, 132 and accompanying text. 
 141. See supra notes 131, 132 and accompanying text. 
 142. Many courts may not conclude that finding a substantive due process violation for 
temporary removal of children from battered mothers is an expansion of fundamental rights. 
However, as noted above, courts often require egregious state action to find a violation in the 
traditional substantive due process analysis, and temporary removal of children may not qualify. 
However, if the courts consider the Thirteenth and Nineteenth Amendments, they may find the state 
action relatively more egregious because they will see how punishing battered mothers may increase 
the batterers’ control over battered women and decrease the likelihood that battered women will 
leave abusive situations. 
BAR-ROB PP3 10/21/2003 9:39:53 AM 
nnn] Tipping the Balance in Favor of Justice 
 129 
in a separation of a battered mother from her child further add to her 
slavery-like conditions in violation of the Thirteenth Amendment. The 
removal of children by caseworkers, sometimes accompanied by verbal 
threats, creates slavery-like conditions for both mother and child. 
Further, caseworkers perpetuate the coercion and enslavement of 
battered women by blaming and punishing them for being abused. This 
blame allows batterers to successfully use threats of legal repercussions 
to stop mothers from escaping abusive situations. Also, removing 
children from a battered mother increases the likelihood that the battered 
mother will continue to be trapped in a slavery-like condition because it 
makes her less likely to obtain help due to fear of repercussion from her 
batterer. 
Second, holding battered mothers accountable for their partners’ 
abuse by blaming, threatening, and punishing them denies women the 
legal and civil autonomy established through the Nineteenth Amendment 
and contemporaneous changes in a woman’s legal status. Child 
protection agencies sometimes fail to distinguish between domestic 
partners in treating the couple as a single unit that engaged in domestic 
violence.143 State agencies may also charge a battered mother for the 
abuse she suffered by her batterer, whether he abused her children, and 
terminate her parental rights. Blaming battered mothers for their 
partner’s abuse invokes the coverture principles that a husband and wife 
are “one” and that they must be accountable for each other’s crimes. 
Such treatment violates the spirit of the Nineteenth Amendment. By 
presuming that a battered mother and her abusive partner are one unit, 
state agencies deny the battered mother an autonomous legal status. 
Since the Nineteenth Amendment provides women with independent 
representation and freedom from the “old doctrine” of coverture, a 
woman’s guarantee of autonomy under the Nineteenth Amendment is 
violated when a state body uses coverture principles to punish a wife for 
her husband’s acts. 
Third, the Nineteenth and Thirteenth Amendments together suggest 
that since married women have shed the bondage of coverture and have 
gained legal autonomy from their husbands, any sexual or domestic 
service coerced from women by physical violence may be considered 
 
 143. Child protection agencies often distinguish between the abusive and non-abusive parent. 
See In re Jeremiah M., 738 N.Y.S.2d 585 (2002) (affirming a finding of neglect against a father 
because he had abused his wife in the presence of her child); In re Kayla B., 690 N.Y.S.2d 444 
(App. Div. 1999) (dismissing neglect petition against mother because her children witnessed an 
isolated domestic violence incident). 
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involuntary servitude under the Thirteenth Amendment. Once the 
condition of involuntary servitude is identified, the court can analogize 
the mother’s condition to that of employees held in involuntary servitude 
by their employers. This observation should lead the court to focus on 
the physical and legal threats made by the batterer rather than on the 
battered mother’s initial decision to enter into the relationship or her 
failure to escape when she was physically able to do so.144 By focusing 
on the batterer’s threats, the court will recognize that battered mothers 
are sometimes trapped in slavery-like conditions and are usually not the 
cause of violence witnessed by their children. 
The Thirteenth and Nineteenth Amendment principles described 
above lead to a Fourteenth Amendment due process analysis that focuses 
on additional fundamental rights along with the fundamental right to 
family integrity. These principles also address the challenges presented 
by the traditional substantive due process analysis. In addition to the 
traditional factors used to determine whether a child should remain in his 
parent’s custody, this analysis adds two fundamental rights to the 
substantive due process balance for determining whether removal from 
battered mothers is a compelling state interest that overrides a mother’s 
fundamental right to raise her children. 
First, autonomy must be provided for both parents, meaning that 
each parent’s actions towards one other and towards the children should 
be considered individually. In making this determination, the court must 
examine which parent performed the abuse and which parent faced 
removal of children or was charged with assault, neglect, or failure to 
protect children. If an abusive boyfriend or husband performed the abuse 
on the mother alone and the mother and her children are separated, the 
scale tips towards a due process violation.145 While consideration of 
autonomy of the mother does not always point to a due process violation 
when children are removed, the Nineteenth Amendment still provides 
 
 144. This analysis may also provide an explanation of a battered mother’s reluctance to escape 
from the battering situation and her failure to prevent abuse to her children. Nevertheless, when a 
child is being battered, the restraints posed on a mother do not indicate that the child should not be 
removed from the mother. 
 145. While situations in which the batterer abused the children and the mother are not the 
focus of this paper, this analysis suggests that if the mother took reasonable steps to protect her 
children from abuse in such a situation, the scale would tip towards a due process violation when 
removal occurs. The court must decide whether the mother took reasonable steps to protect her child. 
In cases where the children are also abused by the batterer, the court should heavily weigh the state’s 
compelling interest in protecting the children from abuse in determining whether the removal 
violated due process. 
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that the court will consider the autonomy of both parents to be held 
accountable for their individual actions, not each other’s abuse. 
Second, constraints on a battered mother must be accounted for when 
her children are removed by state actors for witnessing domestic 
violence. Such constraints may include threats of physical injury by the 
batterer on the mother or children if the mother separated from the 
batterer, reported abuse, or sought services to escape. Also, the court 
must examine whether the batterer violated a court order or police 
instruction by being in the vicinity of the mother and children. Lastly, the 
court must examine whether the batterer physically abused the mother on 
a regular basis with escalating violence and threats. If the court answers 
any of these inquiries affirmatively and the children were not abused, 
then any resulting child removal violates due process because the mother 
is restrained from acting. The more factors that are met, the more the 
scale tips towards a due process violation since the Thirteenth 
Amendment bans slavery-like conditions. Moreover, not considering 
constraints on the mother further perpetuates coercive abuse by 
punishing the mother and making it less likely she will report the 
abuse.146 The more that autonomy and freedom are infringed, the more 
compelling the state interest must be to justify removal. Substantive due 
process analysis is a balancing test and therefore does not create a bright-
line rule for what the state should do in every case in which it is 
considering child removal from a battered mother. However, a state 
agency should consider the additional factors provided here to determine 
the right course of action in each case. 
Not only does this new substantive due process analysis create 
additional factors for consideration in a substantive due process claim, 
but it may also alleviate the challenges battered mothers face in alleging 
a due process violation. The first challenge to traditional substantive due 
process is that courts are guarded about creating new fundamental rights 
under substantive due process.147 This is not a challenge here because it 
can be argued that courts do not need to create new rights. The 
fundamental right to parent and be raised by parents is not a new right 
 
 146. When the children are abused, removal of the children may not constitute a due process 
violation since the restraints on the mother do not override the compelling state interest in removing 
a child in danger from an abusive home. However, when charging the mother criminally for failure 
to protect her children from her partner, the court should consider the restraints on the mother in 
determining whether to criminally charge the mother with a failure to protect her children. 
 147. See supra note 47 and accompanying text. 
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but has been long established by the Supreme Court.148 It also can be 
argued that the rights to autonomy and freedom from slavery-like 
conditions have been protected by the Supreme Court in a different 
setting for many years and can be expanded to the domestic violence 
context because of the many similarities.149 This Comment does not 
argue that a new fundamental right should be created for battered women 
because battered women already have access to due process rights. 
Courts may also legitimately fear adopting this due process analysis 
because they anticipate it leading to abused women suing for private 
rights of action under the Thirteenth and maybe Nineteenth 
Amendments. However, the intent of this analysis is not to advocate the 
creation of a private right of action under either the Thirteenth or 
Nineteenth Amendment.150 Again, the intent of this Comment is only to 
educate the current Fourteenth Amendment due process analysis to make 
it more responsive to women’s rights of autonomy and freedom from 
slavery-like conditions. 
The second challenge to the traditional substantive due process 
analysis is that courts may find that protecting children from witnessing 
abuse is a compelling state interest which justifies removal of children 
from battered mothers, regardless of the mothers’ role in the abuse. To 
overcome this challenge, courts should not be as deferential to the 
assessments of caseworkers who work on child removal cases. Rather, 
courts must determine whether removal violates the Nineteenth 
Amendment by holding mothers accountable for the actions of abusive 
partners. However, the Nineteenth Amendment analysis provided here 
would not prohibit the state from removing children from abusive homes 
when the children are abused by their father and their mother failed to 
take reasonable steps to protect them from the abuse. 
This new substantive due process analysis may also alleviate the last 
 
 148. See supra notes 34–36. 
 149. See supra note 22; supra Part IV.A–B. However, this new analysis does alter the 
application of the existing right to parent by adding Thirteenth and Nineteenth Amendment analysis. 
A court may not see any distinction between altering the application of a right and creating a new 
fundamental right. 
 150. Some commentators have suggested using the Thirteenth Amendment as the basis for the 
federal civil remedy set forth in the Violence Against Women Act, which provides that eligible 
victims may obtain injunctive relief as well as unlimited awards of punitive and compensatory 
damages. See Marcellene Elizabeth Hearn, A Thirteenth Amendment Defense of the Violence Against 
Women Act, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1097, 1100 (1998) (“If the Thirteenth Amendment is an abolition of 
slavery and involuntary servitude for all time, then it should abolish any form of servitude found in 
the twentieth century. Congress has the authority to legislate against ‘badges and incidents’ of 
slavery and involuntary servitude,” which includes violence against women.). 
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challenge—that substantive due process violations against state actors 
are reserved for egregious state action, rather than negligent acts that 
cause unintended loss of liberty. With the new substantive due process 
analysis, courts will realize that removal of children from battered 
mothers is more “egregious” than it seems on its face, since it results in 
blaming and punishing victims of violence. Removal will also be 
considered more egregious since it may have worse long-term effects in 
that a battered mother may be less likely to report or escape abuse in 
order to keep her children. 
It may also be argued that the analysis of the Thirteenth and 
Nineteenth Amendments outside of the context of African slavery and 
voting rights lacks respect for tradition, legislative authority,151 and 
faithfulness to the text of the Constitution. While respect for tradition and 
constitutional text are vital to our common law judicial system, our 
courts have been willing to interpret constitutional rights from the 
Constitution that have not been traditionally recognized or found 
anywhere in the text of the Constitution.152 The Supreme Court has 
considered certain guarantees in the Bill of Rights as a “penumbra” of 
rights when the Constitution does not explicitly specify the right that the 
Court recognized.153 Therefore, the court could also use a similar 
multiple amendment analysis in the area of substantive due process. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The Nineteenth Amendment provided women with an independent 
identity and autonomy in the public realm. It also disposed of the 
coverture concepts that legally subordinated a woman to her husband. 
Through the Nineteenth Amendment and other state statutes, women 
gained the ability to represent themselves in public as well as hold a 
more prominent place in the public sphere. In addition, a woman’s 
 
 151. Justice Scalia objects to the use of legislative history and legislative intent as proper tools 
to interpret the law. SCALIA, supra note 125, at 38. Here the texts of the Thirteenth and Nineteenth 
Amendments alone do not provide adequate basis for the substantive due process analysis provided 
in this Comment. 
 152. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (holding that the freedom to marry is one 
of the “basic civil rights of man” that cannot be violated by states); Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 
160, 178 (1941) (noting that although “the right to move freely from State to State” is not 
“specifically granted by the Constitution,” it was “recognized as a right fundamental to the national 
character of our Federal government”). 
 153. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482–85 (1965) (stating that although the 
“association of people is not mentioned in the Constitution nor in the Bill of Rights” the “First 
Amendment has a penumbra where privacy is protected from governmental intrusion”). 
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autonomous identity ensured that married and unmarried women would 
be held independently accountable for crimes committed. The ACS’s 
practice of punishing battered mothers for the abuse of their husbands 
reverts back to the coverture concept that a husband and wife are “one” 
under the law and denies women legal autonomy. 
The Thirteenth Amendment prohibits slavery, involuntary servitude, 
and all conditions akin to slavery. Coercive battering is a slavery-like 
condition that often entails physical abuse, death threats, and control in 
every aspect of a woman’s life. Battered mothers who endure coercive 
battering often act only to please their batterer in order to survive and 
save the lives of their children. However, unlike hostage situations where 
victims are expected to obey the orders of the threatening guard to 
minimize bodily harm, battered mothers under threat of death are 
sometimes expected by courts to accomplish heroic feats in an attempt to 
shield their children from witnessing them being battered. 
Unfortunately, child protection agencies and even courts often blame 
and criminally punish battered mothers for abuse to themselves and their 
children as well as terminate their parental rights. Blaming and punishing 
battered women only decreases the chances that a battered woman will 
risk her life to report her partner’s abuse. In order to ensure a more 
specialized analysis that will protect both the rights of battered women 
and the state’s compelling interest to protect children, the substantive due 
process analysis advocated in this Comment views a battered mother’s 
substantive due process violation for forcible removal of her children by 
the state in light of the Thirteenth and Nineteenth Amendments. The 
analysis provided in this Comment suggests that courts consider two 
additional fundamental rights in determining the state’s compelling 
interest in protecting children has overcome a mother’s fundamental 
parental right. First, the court must consider whether the removal of 
children denies the mother autonomy by blaming her for another 
individual’s actions. Second, the court must consider the constraints on 
the mother posed by a batterer and whether the removal of her children 
will further prevent the mother from escaping the abuse. 
The Thirteenth and Nineteenth Amendments, under this due process 
analysis of the Fourteenth Amendment, not only enhance a mother’s 
substantive due process claim in the context of child removal, but serve 
to sensitize courts to the signs of coercive battering. Sensitizing courts to 
coercive battering allows them to see the similarities between a battering 
situation and slavery. Through judicial intervention on behalf of battered 
mothers, government agencies will become sensitized to coercive 
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violence, and, rather than mechanically separating battered mothers from 
their children, state agencies will instead provide support to ensure their 
safety and liberty. 
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